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THE PAY OR PLAY PENALTY UNDER
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:
EMERGING ISSUES
KATHRYN L. MOOREt
I. INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act' does not require that employers provide
employees with health care coverage. It does, however, impose an ex-
cise tax on large employers that fail to offer their employees affordable
employer-sponsored health care coverage. 2 The excise tax, commonly
referred to as a "pay-or-play penalty," was scheduled to go into effect
beginning in 2014. The United States Treasury Department ("Trea-
sury"), however, has delayed enforcement of the penalty until 2015 for
employers with 100 or more full-time employees, and until 2016 for
employers with 50 to 99 employees.3
Implementation of the pay-or-play penalty has given rise to a host
of questions and a great deal of uncertainty and consternation among
employers, particularly among small to medium-sized employers. Is-
sues range from very narrow technical questions, such as how to cal-
culate the hours of service of adjunct faculty and airline pilots,4 to
broad planning questions, such as how an employer might restructure
its workforce to avoid the penalty. This Article focuses on emerging
issues in two specific areas, (1) spousal and dependent coverage and
(2) "workforce realignments," that is, employers' efforts to reduce the
size of their workforce or employees' hours to avoid the pay-or-play
penalty.
t Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law, University of Ken-
tucky College of Law. The author would like to thank Scott Bauries and Nicole
Huberfeld for their helpful conversations and insights and Chuck Krebs, Beau Steen-
ken, and Franklin Runge for their research assistance.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
2. I.R.C. § 4980H (2011).
3. In July 2013, the Treasury Department announced that it would delay enforce-
ment of the penalty until 2015. I.R.S. Notice 2013-45 (July 9, 2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-45.pdf. In issuing the final I.R.C. § 4980H regulations in
February 2014, the Treasury Department extended the delay until 2016 for employers
with 50 to 99 workers and provided a transitional rule for 2015 for employers with 100
or more employees. Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage,
79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8574-76 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 54, 301).
4. See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 8551-52 (discussing calculation of hours of service of adjunct faculty and airline
pilots).
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This Article begins by providing an overview of the pay-or-play
penalty. It then discusses two issues with respect to spousal and de-
pendent coverage: (1) determining the affordability of dependent cov-
erage, and (2) employers' recent reductions in spousal coverage. It
then analyzes whether employers' efforts to realign their workforces
in order to avoid the pay-or-play penalty are likely to violate Section
510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")5 and/
or the Affordable Care Act's ("ACA") whistleblower provision. In-
cluded in this discussion is an analysis of whether an employer would
violate the ACA whistleblower provision if it threatens to terminate
the employee if the employee purchases subsidized health insurance
on a health insurance exchange ("exchange").6
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PAY OR PLAY PENALTY
Section 4980H of the Internal Revenue Code imposes an excise
tax on "applicable large employers" that fail to offer employees the op-
portunity to enroll in "minimum essential coverage"'7 under an eligible
employer-sponsored health care plan.8 The pay-or-play penalty only
applies to "applicable large employers." For purposes of the penalty,
an "applicable large employer" is generally defined as an employer 9
that employed an average of at least fifty full-time employees during
the preceding calendar year.10 Full-time employees are generally de-
fined as employees who perform, on average, at least thirty hours of
service per week."
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2010).
6. Health insurance exchanges are structured marketplaces for the sale and
purchase of health insurance. BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ & ANNIE L. MACH, HEALTH IN-
SURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
(ACA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS R42663 7, 8 (Jan. 2013), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42663.pdf ("The exchange concept was included in [the Af-
fordable Care Act] as a means to increase access to health insurance."). They are like a
"shopping mall where individuals evaluate and select appropriate health care plans for
themselves and their families." Erin M. Sweeney, What Employers Must Do (and Not
Do) in 2013 to Get Ready for Health Care Reform, CA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN
200, 200 (June 2013), http://www.dicksteinshapiro.com/sites/default/files/What-
Employers.Must DoAnd Not Do In_2013_ToGetReadyForHealth Care Reform
June_2013.pdf.
7. Section 5000A(f) of the Internal Revenue Code defines minimum essential cov-
erage. It provides that minimum essential coverage includes coverage under an eligible
employer-sponsored plan. I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(B) (2012).
8. I.R.C. § 4980H (2011).
9. In identifying the employer, the aggregation rules applicable to qualified plans
apply. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(C)(i). For an overview of the aggregation rules, see LAw-
RENCE A. FROLIR & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAw OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENE-
FITS, 524-26 (3d ed. 2012).
10. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A).
11. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A). Solely for purposes of determining whether an em-
ployer qualifies as a "large" employer, full-time equivalents must be taken into account.
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An employer may become subject to the pay-or-play penalty in one
of two ways. First, under section 4980H(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code, an employer will be subject to a "no-offer penalty" if (1) the em-
ployer does not offer its full-time employees and their dependents the
opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an eligible
employer-sponsored group health plan for a month, and (2) at least
one full-time employee is certified to claim a premium assistance tax
credit. Second, under section 4980H(b), an employer will be subject to
an "unaffordable coverage penalty" if (1) the employer offers its full-
time employees12 and their dependents the opportunity to enroll in
minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored
group health plan for a month, and (2) at least one full-time employee
is certified to claim a premium assistance tax credit.
Generally, an employee will be eligible for a premium assistance
tax credit13 for health coverage purchased through a health insurance
exchange if (1) the employee's household income is between 100% and
400% of the federal poverty level, and (2) either (a) the employee is not
eligible to participate in an employer-sponsored group health plan or
(b) the employee is eligible to participate in such a plan, but (i) cover-
age under the employer's plan is "unaffordable," that is, the premium
required to be paid exceeds 9.5% of the employee's household in-
come, 14 or (ii) the plan does not provide "minimum value," that is, the
plan's share of the total allowed cost of benefits is less than 60%.15
I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(E). Full-time equivalents are calculated by adding the total hours
worked in a month by employees, other than full-time employees, and dividing by 120.
Id. For example, if ten employees, who were not full-time employees work a total of 240
hours per month for the employer, the employer will be treated as having two full-time
equivalents.
12. The regulations treat an employer as having offered coverage to its full-time
employees so long as it offers coverage to at least 95% of its employees. Treas. Reg.
§ 54.4980H-4(a) (2014). Under the transitional relief, employers with 100 or more em-
ployees will be treated as having offered coverage to its full-time employees so long as it
offers coverage to at least 70% of its employees. Shared Responsibility for Employers
Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8575, XV.D.6-7 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 54, 301).
13. In addition to the premium assistance tax credit, a taxpayer purchasing insur-
ance from an exchange may be eligible for cost-sharing subsidies. The cost-sharing sub-
sidy reduces the taxpayer's out-of-pocket costs for deductibles, coinsurance,
copayments, and other amounts the taxpayers would otherwise be required to pay. Like
the premium tax credit, the eligibility for value of cost-sharing subsidy depends on the
taxpayer's household income. 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2010).
14. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i) (2011).
15. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii). "[Tihe purpose of the minimum value rule is to ensure
that employer-provided insurance must have some real content in order to protect the
employer-mandate penalties of § 4980H and in order to disqualify employees from re-
ceiving the premium tax credits." David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the
Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent
Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAx L. REV. 669, 688 n.100
(Summer 2012).
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The no-offer penalty under section 4980H(a) is $2,000 per year (or
1/12 of $2,000 per month)16 per full-time employee employed by the
employer,17 although 30 full-time employees may be excluded in cal-
culating the penalty. a The no-offer penalty is indexed to the rate of
premium growth after 2014.19 The unaffordable coverage penalty
under section 4980H(b) is $3,000 per year (or 1/12 of $3,000 per
month) for each full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit,20
up to the maximum penalty that could be imposed under section
4980H(a) 21 (or $2,000 per year (or 1/12 of $2,000 per month) times the
employer's entire full-time workforce minus 30 workers). 22 Like the
no-offer penalty, the unaffordable coverage penalty is indexed to the
rate of premium growth after 2014.23
To illustrate, suppose that an employer has 100 full-time employ-
ees and does not offer its full-time employees and their dependents
coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored group health plan. If
two employees are certified to claim a premium assistance tax credit,
that is, they purchase subsidized health insurance on an exchange,
the employer will be subject to a penalty of $140,000 that year. 24 In
contrast, if the employer offers coverage, but the coverage is unafford-
able for two employees and they purchase subsidized insurance on an
exchange, the penalty would only be $6,000 that year.25
The following chart provides an overview of the section 4980H
pay-or-play penalty.
16. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(1).
17. I.R.C. § 4980H(a).
18. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(D)(i)(I).
19. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(5).
20. I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(1).
21. I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(2).
22. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(D)(i)(II).
23. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(5).
24. $2,000 x (100-30) = $2,000 x 70 = $140,000.
25. $3,000 x 2 = $6,000.
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III. SPOUSAL AND DEPENDENT COVERAGE
As noted above, section 4980H of the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides that a large employer may be subject to an excise tax if it fails to
offer affordable coverage to its employees and their dependents. Sec-
tion 4980H, however, does not define the term "dependent." The Trea-
sury regulations fill this gap by defining dependent as an employee's
child (as defined in section 152(f)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code)26
under the age of twenty-six and explicitly excluding spouses from the
definition of dependent. 27 Thus, under the regulations, an employer
will not be subject to a pay-or-play penalty for failure to offer coverage
to its employees' spouses.
A. "AFFORDABILITY" OF DEPENDENT COVERAGE
At first blush, the pay-or-play regulations would seem to favor de-
pendents over spouses by subjecting employers to a penalty for failure
to offer dependents affordable coverage but not for failure to offer
spouses affordable coverage. In some instances, however, the spouse
may actually be better off than the dependents if the employer does
not offer spousal coverage because the spouse, but not the dependents,
may be eligible for subsidized coverage through an exchange if the
26. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1) (2008) (defining child as a son, daughter, stepchild, adopted
child or child placed for foster care).
27. Treas. Reg. § 54.4980H-1(a)(12) (2014).
615
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spouse does not have access to "affordable" employer-sponsored
coverage.28
Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code provides a premium
assistance tax credit for certain "applicable taxpayers" who purchase
health insurance through an exchange. Applicable taxpayers are de-
fined as taxpayers with annual household income between 100% and
400% of the federal poverty line based on the taxpayer's family size.29
In order to be eligible for a premium tax credit, "applicable taxpayers"
must not be eligible for government-sponsored health care coverage,
such as Medicare or Medicaid, or affordable employer-sponsored
health insurance. 30
Section 36B provides that employer-sponsored health insurance is
considered to be affordable if the employee's share of the premium
does not exceed 9.5% of the employee's household income.31 The stat-
ute, however, is ambiguous as to whether the employee's share of the
premium refers to the cost of employee-only coverage or family
coverage. 32
Family coverage is typically much more expensive than individual
coverage, and employers typically require employees to pay more for
family coverage than for individual coverage. For example, in 2013,
the average annual worker contribution to premiums for single cover-
28. Depending on the employee's share of the premium, even some low-income em-
ployees without dependents might be better off with subsidized coverage through an
exchange than with employer-provided coverage.
Under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code, a premium tax credit is provided
on a sliding scale to taxpayers with household income between 100% and 400% of the
federal poverty line. Taxpayers with household income that is less than 133% of the
federal poverty line are expected to contribute no more than 2% of household income
toward health insurance while taxpayers with household income between 300% and
400% of the federal poverty line are expected to contribute no more than 9.5% of house-
hold income toward health insurance. The amount taxpayers with household income
between 133% and 300% of the federal poverty line are expected to contribute gradually
increases from 2% to 9.5% of household income. Generally, the breakeven point, that is,
the point at which an individual would be better off with employer-provided health in-
surance than government-subsidized health insurance, is household income of 350% to
375% of the federal poverty line for individuals and 400% of the federal poverty line for
a household of four. See Gamage, supra note 14 at 687-91.
29. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A) (2011).
30. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)-(C).
31. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C).
32. For a discussion of why the statutory language is ambiguous, see RICHARD V.
BURKHAUSER, SEAN LyoNs, & KosAu I. SIMON, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEANING AND
MEASUREMENT OF "AFFORDABLE" IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, Working Paper 17279,
6-8 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/wl7279.pdf.
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age was $999 while the average annual worker contribution to premi-
ums for family coverage was $4,565.33
After the Affordable Care Act was enacted, there was considera-
ble debate as to whether the cost of employee-only or family coverage
should be taken into account in determining whether employer-spon-
sored health insurance is affordable for dependents. 3 4
In Notice 2011-73, the IRS clarified that for purposes of the sec-
tion 4980H pay-or-play penalty, affordability is to be based on the em-
ployee's share of the premium for individual, or self-only, coverage and
not family coverage.35 When the Treasury Department issued the fi-
nal section 36B premium tax regulations in May 2012,36 it determined
that affordability for purposes of employee's eligibility is based on the
employee's share of the premium for employee-only coverage. 3 7 The
Treasury Department, however, reserved a rule for determining af-
fordability of employer-sponsored coverage for dependents.3 8 On Feb-
ruary 1, 2013, the Department of Treasury amended the section 36B
regulations to provide that the cost of employee-only coverage is to be
taken into account in determining whether dependent coverage is eli-
gible for a premium tax credit.3 9 On that same day, the Treasury De-
partment issued proposed section 5000A regulationS4 0 providing that
for purposes of the individual mandate, affordability is to be based on
the employee's share of the cost of family coverage.4 1
Thus, under the current Treasury guidance, a dependent is not
eligible for subsidized coverage under an exchange if the employee's
33. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2013 ANNUAL SURVEY, 74-75, Exhibits 6.3 & 6.4
(2013).
34. See, e.g. BURKHAUSER ET. AL., supra note 31; Sarah Kliff, The Affordable Care
Act's 'affordability' paradox, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2011, 12:52 PM), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-affordable-care-acts-affordability-para
dox/2011/12/14/gIQAAGhBuO blog.html.
35. The final Treasury Regulations do not change that rule. Shared Responsibility
for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8546 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 54, 301) (stating that affordability is based on cost of self-
only coverage).
36. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30377-01 (May 23, 2012)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 602), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2012-05-23/pdf/2012-12421.pdf.
37. Id. at 30388 (adding Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(1)).
38. Id. at 30389 (reserving Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(2)).
39. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 78 Fed. Reg. 7264-01, 7264-65 (Feb. 1,
2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (adding Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(2)),
available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-01/pdf/2013-02136.pdf
40. Shared Responsibility Payment for Not Maintaining Minimum Essential Cov-
erage, 78 Fed. Reg. 7314-01 (Feb. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
41. Id. at 7326 (proposing Treas. Reg. § 1.5000A-3(e)(3)(ii)(B)). This regulation
was made final on August 30, 2013. Responsibility Payment for Not Maintaining Mini-
mum Essential Coverage, 78 Fed. Reg. 53646, 53659 (Aug. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1, 602) (finalizing Treas. Reg. § 1.5000A-3(e)(3)(ii)(B)).
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share of self-only coverage is affordable, but no excise tax under the
section 5000A individual mandate will be imposed if the dependent
does not have health insurance and the employee's share of the premi-
ums for family coverage exceeds 9.5% of household income.
According to one estimate, defining affordability for dependents in
terms of the cost of employee-only coverage rather than family cover-
age could cause more than 6,000,000 workers who would otherwise
have been eligible for subsidized health insurance through an ex-
change to find themselves in a "no-man's land" with access to afforda-
ble single health care coverage but no access to affordable family
coverage. 4 2 According to another study, this definition of affordability
may adversely impact 144,000 Californians who would otherwise have
been eligible for subsidized coverage through an exchange if affordable
dependent coverage had been based on the employee's share of the
premiums for family coverage. 43
If an employer does not offer spousal coverage, then the spouse
may be eligible for subsidized insurance through an exchange if the
family's household income is less than 400% of the federal poverty line
- even if the rest of the spouse's family is eligible for affordable em-
ployer-sponsored coverage. 44 Whether a spouse would be better off
with or without employer-provided health insurance depends princi-
pally on the employee's share of the premium for employer-sponsored
health insurance and the family's household income relative to the
federal poverty line.45 Generally, spouses are better off with subsi-
dized health insurance through an exchange, rather than employer-
sponsored coverage, if their household income is no more than 350% to
375% of the federal poverty line.46
B. REDUCTIONS IN SPOUSAL COVERAGE
Since the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, employers have
begun to cut back on some spousal coverage. Specifically, employers
42. Burkhauser et al., supra note 31, at 26-27, 37.
43. KEN JACOBS ET AL., PROPOSED REGULATIONS COULD LIMIT ACCESS To AFFORDA-
BLE HEALTH COVERAGE FOR WORKERS' CHILDREN AND FAMILY MEMBERS (University of
California, Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education and University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles Center for Health Policy Research 2011), available at http:l
laborcenter.berkeley.edulhealthcare/Proposed Regulations11.pdf.
44. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.36B-2(a)(2), (c)(3) (2013) (providing that a taxpayer is al-
lowed premium assistance for a month in which one or more members of the taxpayer
family, including the taxpayer's spouse, is not eligible for "minimum essential cover-
age," including affordable employer-sponsored coverage).
45. For a detailed description of how the premium tax credit is computed, see
Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg., 30377, 30382-83 (May 23, 2012)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2012-05-23/pdfl2012-12421.pdf.
46. See supra note 27.
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have begun to reduce coverage for working spouses whose employers
offer the spouses health insurance. Interestingly, few, if any, employ-
ers have changed coverage for spouses who do not have access to
health insurance through their own employers.
Employers have reduced coverage for spouses with access to
health insurance through their own employers in couple of different
ways. Some employers have added a "surcharge" or increased the
share of premiums workers must pay for spousal coverage for spouses
who have access to health insurance through their own jobs.47 Other
employers have gone further and eliminated coverage for such
spouses.48
Employers (and critics of the Affordable Care Act) often attribute
these changes in spousal coverage for working spouses to the Afforda-
ble Care Act.49 For example, in perhaps the most widely publicized
case,50 the United Parcel Service ("UPS") explained that it had de-
cided to eliminate spousal coverage for spouses with access to health
insurance through their own employers in order to address costs im-
posed by the Affordable Care Act and "allow [ ] UPS to continue to pro-
vide its employees and their families with the coverage they need and
value, at an affordable cost."5 1 Other employers have claimed that
47. See ToWERS WATSON, RESHAPING HEALTH CARE: BEST PERFORMERS LEADING
THE WAY 19, Fig. 22 (2013) (showing that in 2013, 20% of employers responding to sur-
vey use spousal surcharges when other coverage is available and 13% of employers plan
to add such surcharges in 2014).
48. See, e.g., Jose Pagliery, UPS Cuts Insurance to 15,000 Spouses, Blames Obama-
care, CNN MONEY (Aug. 22, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/21/news/companies/
ups-obamacare/; Julie Rovner, Employer's Trim Health Costs by Cutting Coverage for
Spouses, NPR.oRa HEALTH BLOG "SHOTS" (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:20 AM ET), http:/www
.npr.org/blogs/healthy/2013/09/10/223786934/employers-trim-health-costs-by-cutting-
coverage-for-spouses; Steven Greenhouse, UPS to End Health Benefits for Spouses of
Some Workers, N.Y. TIMES at B1 (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/
business/ups-to-end-health-benefits-for-spouses-of-some-workers.html; Jen Wieczner,
Why Your Boss is Dumping Your Wife, WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:45
pm EDT), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-your-boss-is-dumping-your-wife-
2013-02-22; Working Spouse Eligibility: Frequently Asked Questions 1 (July 15, 2013),
available at http://i.cdn.turner.com/money/2013/images/08/21/UPS-Spousal-Coverage
.pdf (stating that according to market data, 35% of companies planned in 2014 to ex-
clude spousal coverage for working spouses with coverage through their own employer).
49. See, e.g., Chelsey Levingston, Premier Health dropping health insurance for
working spouses, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 2013 WLNR 26409710 (Oct. 18, 2003); Dana
Milbank, Democrats own health care; The law will be blamed for all bad things, even if
it's not at fault, WASHINGTONPOST.com, 2013 WLNR 26551780 (Oct. 23, 2013).
50. See, e.g., Pagliery, supra note 47.
51. Working Spouse Eligibility: Frequently Asked Questions 2 (July 13, 2015),
available at http://i.cdn.turner.com/money/2013/images/08/21/UPS-Spousal-Coverage
.pdf.
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they have made such changes in response to section 49801,52 the Af-
fordable Care Act's so-called "Cadillac tax."5 3
These changes in spousal benefits are undoubtedly driven by cost
considerations. Indeed, UPS claims that it will save $60 million per
year by eliminating spousal coverage for working spouses with access
to employment-based health insurance through their own
employers. 54
It is unlikely, however, that such changes are driven solely, or
even largely, by escalating costs caused by the Affordable Care Act.5 5
High health care costs have long been a problem in this country.56
52. Section 49801(a) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes an excise tax on any
excess benefit provided under applicable employer-sponsored coverage. Generally, a
health plan qualifies as applicable employer-sponsored coverage if the value of coverage
is excludable from the employee's income under section 106 of the Internal Revenue
Code. I.R.C. § 4980I(d)(1)(A). An excess benefit arises if the annual cost of coverage
exceeds $10,200 (in the case of individual coverage) or $27,500 (in the case of family
coverage), multiplied by a health cost adjustment percentage. I.R.C. § 4980I(b). The
health cost adjustment percentage increases the dollar limits to the extent that the
2018 per employee cost under the Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard option under the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan exceeds the 2010 cost by more than 55%.
I.R.C. § 49801(b)(3)(C)(ii). After 2018, the dollar limits will be adjusted for inflation.
I.R.C. § 49801(b)(3)(C)(v).
53. See, e.g., Rich Kirchen, Konecranes dropping spouse coverage, blames Obama-
care's Cadillac tax, BUSINESS JOURNAL (Nov. 5, 2013, 2:35 pm CST), http://www.bizjour
nals.com/milwaukee/news/2013/11/05/konecranes-drops-spouse-coverage.html; McGre-
gor McCance, University Employees Will See Significant Changes to Health Plan This
Year, UVA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2013), http://news.virginia.edu/content/university-employ-
ees-will-see-significant-changes-health-plan-year. For an overview of the "Cadillac tax,"
see Julie Piotrowski, Excise Tax on Cadillac Plans, HEALTH AFFAIRS: HEALTH POLICY
BRIEFS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief
id=99.
54. Jay Hancock, UPS won't insure spouses of many employees, USA TODAY (Aug.
20, 2013, 4:55 pm EDT), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/20/
ups-spouses-health-insurance/2651713/. Interestingly, according to a recent Employee
Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) study, costs may actually increase for some employ-
ers that exclude coverage for working spouses with access to their own coverage if they
continue to cover nonworking spouses because nonworking spouses may spend more on
health care services than working spouses. Paul Fronstin, The Cost of Spousal Health
Coverage, 35 EBRI NOTES 2 (Jan. 2014).
55. Milbank, supra note 48.
56. In 2010, the United States spent $2.6 trillion, or the equivalent of $8,402 per
person, on health care. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH & EDU-
CATIONAL TRUST, HEALTH CARE COSTs: A PRIMER 4 (May 2012). This $2.6 trillion repre-
sents 17.9% of the nation's gross domestic product (GDP), the highest of any developed
nation. Id. at 4, 7. Moreover, health care spending has exceeded growth in the U.S.
economy virtually every year for the last 30 years, and the cost of employer-provided
health insurance has increased dramatically over the years. NATIONAL HEALTH INSTI-
TUTE FOR HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT, U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING: THE BIG PICTURE
3, Fig. 3 (May 2012); see KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCA-
TIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 32, at 72-73, Exhibits 6.3 & 6.4
(showing that average total premium for employer-provided health insurance for a sin-
gle individual increased from $2,196 in 1999 to $5,884 in 2013, and the average total
premium for family coverage increased from $5,791 in 1999 to $16,351 in 2013).
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Over the years, employers have addressed rising health care costs in a
variety of ways, including shifting costs to employees by increasing
the share of premiums employees are required to pay5 7 and imposing
higher deductibles5 8 and co-payments for doctor visits.5 9 Moreover,
the growth in health care costs has actually slowed since the enact-
ment of the Affordable Care Act.60
It is also unlikely that the Cadillac tax is the true motivation be-
hind employers' elimination of spousal coverage for working spouses
with their own employment-based health insurance. The Cadillac tax
is not scheduled to go into effect until 2018.61 It seems unlikely that
employers have eliminated spousal coverage solely, or even princi-
pally, due to a tax that is not scheduled to go into effect for four
years.62 Moreover, it is quite possible that the Cadillac tax, a politi-
cally unpopular tax, will be repealed before its effective date.63
This is not to suggest that employers need not and will not change
their health care plans if the Cadillac tax goes into effect in 2018. Ac-
cording to some estimates, the Cadillac tax may affect as many as 60%
of employers. 64 If the Cadillac tax goes into effect, many employers
57. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 32, at 70, Exhibit 6.1 (showing that over time
employers have required employees to pay a larger percentage of health insurance
premiums).
58. See id. at 103, Exhibit 7.2 (showing increase over time in number of employees
in plans with deductibles).
59. See id. at 130-31, Exhibits 7.29, 7.30 (showing increase over time in co-pay-
ments for primary care and specialty doctor visits).
60. See TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (Nov. 2013) (asserting that the Affordable
Care Act is contributing to slow down the rate of growth).
61. Bradley Herring & Lisa Korin Lentz, How Can We Bend the Cost Curve: What
can we expect from the "Cadillac" tax in 2018 and Beyond, 48 INQUIRY 322, 322-23 (Win-
ter 2011-2012) ("The amendment to reconcile the Senate and House versions of the leg-
islation postponed the implementation of the Senate's excise tax proposal from 2013 to
2018").
62. Kirchen, supra note 52. But see INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANS, 2013 EMPLOYER SPONSORED HEALTH CARE: ACA's IMPACT 22, Exhibit
26 (2013), available at https://www.ifebp.org/pdf/research/2103ACAlmpactSurvey.pdf
(reporting that 17% of surveyed employers said they were taking action in 2013 to avoid
the 2018 Cadillac tax).
63. See Kirchen, supra note 52 ("Because the Cadillac tax is so unpopular with
both political parties, insurance and benefits experts predict the tax will be repealed.");
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health-Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and HCERA: Con-
tingent, Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls, N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS &
ExECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 7.02 (2010) (stating that the prognosis for the tax on "Cad-
illac" plans is at best uncertain).
64. LAURA TILLMAN & DAVID POPPER, TOWERS WATSON, HEALTH CARE REFORM:
FOR EMPLOYERS, LOOMING FEARS MASK UNPRECEDENTED EMPLOYER OPPORTUNITIES TO
MITIGATE COSTS, RISKS AND RESET TOTAL REWARDS 5 (2010), available at http://www.
towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2010/05/The-
Impact-of-Health-Care-Reform-on-Employers. Cf Herring & Lentz, supra note 60, at
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will be required to redesign their plans to avoid the tax. Eliminating
spousal coverage for working spouses with access to health insurance
through their own employers, however, is unlikely to be the sole, or
even principal, means of avoiding the tax.65
IV. "REALIGNING THE WORKFORCE"
Reports abound that employers have reduced, or plan to reduce,
the size of their workforces and/or their employees' hours in order to
avoid the pay-or-play mandate.66 Indeed, Maureen Groppe, a Gannett
reporter, received the National Press Foundation's Feddie Award67 for
her report on how schools across the state of Indiana were cutting the
hours of teachers' assistants, cafeteria workers, bus drivers, and other
school aides to avoid the Affordable Care Act's employer mandate.6 8
Just how widespread this activity actually is is subject to de-
bate.69 According to a survey by the United States Chamber of Com-
merce and International Franchise Association, more than 50% of
businesses with 40 to 70 employees will make personnel decisions in-
tended to keep their workforces below the 50 full-time employee
threshold.70 In contrast, according to a survey by the International
Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, just under 20% of employers
with 50 or fewer workers have or plan in the next 12 months to reduce
their hiring to get or remain below the 50-employee threshold and/or
adjust hours so that fewer employees qualify as full-time employees
322, 326, Table 2 (assuming 6% premium growth, estimating that about 15% of plans
will be subject to the tax in 2018 and by 2029, 75% of plans will be subject to the tax).
65. For a discussion of the ways in which employers may change their health care
plans to avoid the Cadillac tax, see, for example, FEDERAL HEALTH CARE REFORM: Ex-
CISE TAx ON HIGH-COST EMPLOYER PLANs 13 (American Academy of Actuaries & Society
of Actuaries 2010); BEHIND THE NUMBERS: MEDICAL COST TRENDS FOR 2011, at 19 (Price-
waterhouseCoopers' Health Research Institute 2010).
66. See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Local governments cutting hours over Obamacare costs,
WASHINGTONPOST.com, 2013 WLNR 20916009 (Aug. 23, 2013); Jed Graham, Obama-
Care Employer Mandate: A List Of Cuts To Work Hours, Jobs, INVESTORS.COM (Dec. 19,
2013, 9:36 AM ET), http://news.investors.com/politics-obamacare/121913-669013-obama
care-employer-mandate-a-list-of-cuts-to-work-hours-jobs.htm (providing lengthy list of
reported cuts).
67. Star's Washington reporter wins national award, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, A6, 2013
WLNR 32483217 (Dec. 29, 2013).
68. See Maureen Groppe, SCHOOL AIDES' hours SLICED, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Al, 2013 WLNR 14114461 (June 7, 2013).
69. For estimates on the impact of the Affordable Care Act on the number of indi-
viduals with employment-based health insurance, see CBO AND JCT's ESTIMATES OF
THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING EM.
PLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE (Congressional Budget Office, March 2012).
70. Grace-Marie Turner, 6 Obamacare Realities for Businesses in 2014, U.S. CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE (Jan. 14, 2014, 5:45 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/blog/6-obama
care-realities-businesses-2014.
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eligible for health insurance.7 1  Not surprisingly, larger employers
(defined as those with more than 50 employees) 72 were much less
likely to report that they had or were going to reduce the size of their
workforces in order to avoid the employer mandate.73 Larger employ-
ers, however, were almost as likely to report that they had or planned
to reduce work hours of individual employees to reduce the number of
employees eligible for health insurance.74
Generally, employers' attempts to avoid the employer mandate
may arise under five different scenarios:
* Scenario One: An employer with fewer than 50 employees
and no health care plan may decide not to hire additional employ-
ees to keep its workforce below the 50 employee threshold.
* Scenario Two: An employer with more than 50 employees
and no health care plan may decide to terminate some employees
to keep its workforce below the 50 employee threshold.
* Scenario Three: An employer with more than 50 employees
and no health care plan may decide to reduce the hours of some
employees so those employees do not qualify as full-time employ-
ees. (In this scenario, the employer would not establish a health
care plan but might pay a section 4980H(a) failure to cover pen-
alty with respect its full-time employees.)7 5
* Scenario Four: An employer with more than 50 employees
and an existing health care plan may decide to terminate some
employees so the employer does not have to provide health care
coverage with respect to those employees. (In this scenario, the
71. INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS, supra note 61, at 17,
Exhibit 16. An April 2013 Gallup Poll of 603 small business owners reported similar
findings. See Dennis Jacobe, Half of U.S. Small Businesses Think Health Law Bad for
Them, GALLUP ECONOMY (May 10, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162386/half-
small-businesses-think-health-law-bad.aspx (reporting that 19% of small business own-
ers reduced the number of employees and 18% reduced the hours of employees to part-
time).
72. See INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANs, supra note 61,
at 17. The International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans surveyed a wide cross
section of employers ranging from those with fewer than 50 employees to those with
more than 10,000 employees. Survey results on workforce adjustments were divided
into two different categories: employers with 50 or fewer employees and employers with
more than 50 employees.
73. See id. (reporting that 0.5% of surveyed large employers have reduced and an-
other 0.5% plan within the next 12 months to reduce hiring to get or remain under the
under 50-employee threshold).
74. See id. (reporting that 3.8% of surveyed large employers adjusted hours and
another 11.5% of surveyed large employers plan to adjust hours within the next 12
months so fewer employees qualify for full-time employee status for health insurance).
75. As discussed above, an employer with more than 50 full-time employees that
did not offer health insurance to its employees and dependents would be subject to a no-
coverage penalty under section 4980H(a) if at least one of its full-time employees pur-
chased subsidized health insurance on an exchange. See supra Section II.
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employer would retain its health care plan and cover its remain-
ing employees according to the terms of the plan.)
* Scenario Five: An employer with more than 50 employees
and an existing health care plan may decide to reduce the hours of
some of its employees so those employees do not qualify as full-
time employees eligible for coverage.76 (Under this scenario, the
employer would again retain its health care plan and cover the
remaining employees according to the terms of the plan.)
Commentators have suggested that such "workforce realign-
ments" may run afoul of Section 510 of Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") and/or the Affordable Care Act's whistleblower
protection provision.77 This section begins by analyzing possible Sec-
tion 510 claims. It then turns to the Affordable Care Act's
whistleblower provision.
A. ERISA SECTION 510
Congress enacted Section 510 of ERISA78 "primarily to prevent
employers from discharging or harassing their employees in order to
keep them from obtaining ERISA-protected benefits."79 Section 510's
"interference clause"80 provides that "[it shall be unlawful for any
person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary for . . . the purpose of interfering
76. For purposes of determining whether an employer is an applicable large em-
ployer and thus subject to the penalty, the hours of part-time employees will be taken
into account. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(E) (2011). For purposes of applying the penalty, only
full-time employees will be taken into account. I.R.C. § 4980H(a)(2).
77. See, e.g., James M. Nelson, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
ERISA § 510 and the Next Generation of Benefits Litigation Concerns, A.B.A. SEC. OF
LABOR AND Emp'T LAw EMP. BENEFITS Comm. NEWSLETTER (Spring 2013), http://www
.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor-lawebc newsletter/13_sprebcnews/
ppaca.html; James R. Napoli, The View from Proskauer: Health Care Reform Litigation
Risks - The Intersection of ERISA Section 510 and the Affordable Care Act's
Whistleblower Provisions, PROSKAUER'S ERISA PRACTICE CENTER BLOG, (May 31, 2013),
http://www.erisapracticecenter.com/2013/05/31/the-view-from-proskauer-health-care-
reform-litigation-risks-the-intersection-of-erisa-section-510-and-the-affordable-care-
acts-whistleblower-provisions/; Adam C. Solander & Kara M. Maciel, Where ERISA And
The Affordable Care Act Collide, LAw360 (Dec. 5, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://www.ebglaw
.com/publications/where-erisa-and-the-affordable-care-act-collide-as-appeared-in-law
360/.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012).
79. Kowalski v. L & F Prods., 82 F.3d 1283, 1287 (3d Cir. 1996). See also Tolle v.
Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the purpose of
section 510 is to "prevent persons and entities from taking actions which might cut off
or interfere with a participant's ability to collect present or future benefits or which
punish a participant for exercising his or her rights under an employee benefit plan").
80. ERISA Section 510 contains three other prohibitions: (1) an exercise clause, (2)
a whistleblower provision, and (3) a multiemployer plan provision. An employer's deci-
sion to reduce the size of its workforce or its employees' hours to avoid the employer
mandate only gives rise to concerns under the interference clause.
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with the attainment of any right to which such participant may be-
come entitled under the plan, [ERISA], or the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act."81 This provision was viewed as a "crucial part
of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent
the provision of promised benefits."82
1. Individuals Protected by Section 510
By its terms, Section 510 prohibits an employer from taking ad-
verse employment action against a "participant" or "beneficiary." Sec-
tion 3(7) of ERISA defines a participant as "any employee or former
employee of an . .. employee organization, who is or may become eligi-
ble to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan
which covers employees of such employer or members of such organi-
zation, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such bene-
fit."8 3 Section 3(8) of ERISA defines a beneficiary as a "person
designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit
plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder."84
Determining whether an individual is a "participant" protected by
ERISA Section 510 gives rise to two separate questions. First, is the
individual an employee or former employee? Second, if the individual
is an employee or former employee, is the individual or may the indi-
vidual become eligible to receive a benefit from an employee benefit
plan?
Under Scenario One, two different types of individuals may seek
to challenge the employer's failure to hire them: (1) an individual who
has never worked for the company, and (2) a former employee who is
seeking to be rehired. An individual who has never worked for the
company would be neither an employee nor a former employee and
thus clearly would not qualify as a participant protected by ERISA
Section 510. Whether a former employee seeking reemployment
would qualify as a participant entitled to protection under ERISA Sec-
tion 510 requires a little more analysis.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed
the question of who is a participant for purposes of Section 510, the
Court in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch85 addressed the ques-
tion of who is a participant for purposes of ERISA's disclosure rules.86
In that case, the Court declared that "the term 'participant' is natu-
rally read to mean either 'employees in, or reasonably expected to be
81. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012).
82. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990).
83. ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2014).
84. ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
85. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
86. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989).
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in, currently covered employment,' or former employees who 'have ...
a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment' or who
have 'a colorable claim' to vested benefits."8 7 The Court further an-
nounced that "[iln order to establish that he or she 'may become eligi-
ble' for benefits, a claimant must have a colorable claim that (1) he or
she will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2) eligibility require-
ments will be fulfilled in the future."88
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Becker v. Mack Trucks, Inc.89 relied on the Supreme Court's Firestone
decision to determine whether former employees who sought to be re-
hired had standing to bring a claim under Section 510. The court held
that former employees with vested pension benefits had standing as
"participants" under Section 510 because they satisfied the second ele-
ment of the Firestone test that they have "a colorable claim" to vested
benefits.90 The court, however, held that former employees whose
pension benefits were not vested at the time that their employment
was terminated did not have standing as participants under Section
510. The court first found that the employees, who were covered by a
collective bargaining agreement, did not satisfy the first element of
the test, that they have a reasonable expectation of returning to cov-
ered employment, because their recall rights had expired or been
waived.9 1 The court then found that they did not satisfy the second,
colorable claim to vested benefits, element because their past service
"gave rise to a 'forfeitable benefit' and that such a 'contingent claim for
future benefits does not satisfy the dictates of Firestone'."92 According
to the court, "a legally unenforceable claim to contingent benefits can-
not establish a colorable claim to vested benefits under Firestone."93
If a court were to apply the Becker analysis, it appears that for-
mer employees under Scenario One would rarely, if ever, have stand-
ing as participants. First, absent special circumstances, former
employees are unlikely to have a reasonable expectation of returning
to covered employment. Second, because the employer has no plan in
87. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 117-18.
89. 281 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2002).
90. Becker v. Mack Trucks, Inc. 281 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2002). The court, how-
ever, rejected their claims on the merits because, according to the court, section 510
does not encompass the decision to hire or rehire. Becker, 281 F.3d at 379-83. For a
critique of this aspect of the court's decision, see Becker v. Mack Trucks, Inc.: Third
Circuit Holds that Refusal to Rehire Participant Never Violates Section 510, 10 NO. 1
ERISA LITIG. REP. (Newsl.) 13 (April 2002).
91. Becker, 281 F.3d at 377-78.
92. Id. at 378 (quoting Shawley v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 989 F.2d 652, 657 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
93. Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
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Scenario One, former employees would not be able to establish a color-
able claim to vested benefits.
Neither ERISA nor the Affordable Care Act requires an employer
to establish a health care plan. The Affordable Care Act may en-
courage employers to establish health care plans by imposing a pen-
alty, or excise tax, on applicable large employers that fail to offer an
affordable health care plan to their employees.94 It does not, however,
require employers to establish such plans. Employers, under the Af-
fordable Care Act, are free to pay the penalty rather than establish a
plan. Thus, former employees under Scenario One would not be able
to establish a colorable claim to vested health benefits because the em-
ployer does not have a plan.
Similar reasoning would apply to former employees under Scena-
rio Two. The employer has no health care plan. Thus, former employ-
ees would not be able to establish a colorable claim to vested health
care benefits.
Scenario Three involves a reduction in hours rather than a termi-
nation of employment. Thus, employees with reduced hours would re-
main active employees and the former employee analysis of Firestone!
Becker would not apply. Nevertheless, employees with reduced hours
are unlikely to be able to establish that their employer's reduction in
their hours interfered with any right to which they might become enti-
tled under the plan or ERISA. Just as in Scenarios One and Two,
there is no plan. Thus, the employer's reduction in their hours would
not interfere with any right to which they may become entitled under
a plan. In addition, because neither ERISA nor the Affordable Care
Act require that an employer establish a plan, an employer's reduction
in their hours would not interfere with a right or potential right under
a plan. Rather, it would simply relieve the employer of a potential
excise tax liability under section 4980H of the Internal Revenue Code.
Unlike in the first three scenarios, there is a plan in Scenarios
Four and Five. The two scenarios differ in that Scenario Four involves
a termination of employment while Scenario Five involves a reduction
in hours.
If the Firestone/Becker test for standing of former employees were
applied to Scenario Four, few, if any, former employees would have
standing. As noted above, under this test, a former employee must
have a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment or
94. How effective the pay-or-play penalty will be in light of the relatively low cost
of the penalty compared to the high cost of employer-provided health care coverage is
subject to debate. See Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health In-
surance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 906-
12 (2011).
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a colorable claim to vested benefits. Absent special circumstances, for-
mer employees are unlikely to have a reasonable expectation of re-
turning to covered employment. In addition, absent special
circumstances, former employees are unlikely to have a colorable
claim to vested health benefits. ERISA's vesting rules apply to pen-
sion plans,95 not welfare plans.96 Thus, absent a promise on the part
of the employer to vest benefits under its health care plan,97 former
employees will not have a colorable claim to vested health benefits.
A strong argument, however, can be made that standing under
ERISA Section 510 should not be limited to former employees with a
colorable claim to vested benefits. As the Supreme Court held in Inter-
Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rail-
way Company,98 Section 510 protection is not limited to pension bene-
fits. Rather, it extends to welfare benefits as well.99 Thus, at least in
the context of a welfare benefit claim, standing for former employees
should not be limited to those who can establish a colorable claim to
vested welfare benefits.100 Instead, former employees who can estab-
lish a colorable claim to any welfare benefit 01 should have
standing. 102
Recognizing that the Supreme Court's definition of the term par-
ticipant in Firestone "developed outside of the standing context,"103
several circuit courts 104 have applied a "but for test" to determine
95. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2014).
96. ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (2014).
97. Claims to vested welfare benefits arise most commonly with respect to retiree
health benefits. See Kathryn L. Moore, The New Retiree Health VEBAs, NYU REV. OF
EMP. BENEFITS AND ExEc. COMP. 7-1, 7-12 to 7-14 (2008) (discussing cases involving
claims to vested retiree health benefits).
98. 520 U.S. 510 (1997).
99. Inter-Modal Rail Emp. Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520
U.S. 510, 514-15 (1997).
100. Indeed, the court in Becker left open the possibility that it might apply a differ-
ent rule to Section 510 claims with respect to welfare benefits when it distinguished
Inter-Modal on the ground that it concerned welfare benefits that do not vest. Becker,
281 F.3d at 379.
101. See ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (defining participant as "any employee or
former employee ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from
an employee benefit plan") (emphasis added).
102. The Court in Inter-Modal remanded the case for the lower court to address the
employer's argument that when applied to welfare benefits that do not vest, section 510
'only protects an employee's right to cross the 'threshold of eligibility' for welfare bene-
fits." Inter-Modal, 520 U.S. at 516-17.
103. Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.3d 1404, 1410 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Swinney v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 1995)) (internal citation omitted).
104. See, e.g., McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 743 (9th Cir. 1999); Shahid,
76 F.3d at 1410; Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1221 (5th Cir. 1992).
See also Jones v. Allen, No. 2:11-cv-380, 2014 WL 347035, at *6 (S.D. Ohio, Jan. 30,
2013) (applying "but for" test).
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whether a former employee has standing under Section 510.105 Under
this "but for" test, "a former employee has standing as a 'participant'
where, but for the alleged misrepresentations or breaches of duty by
fiduciaries, the employee 'would have been in a class eligible to be-
come a member of the plan."'106
Under the "but for" test, whether a former employee would have
standing in Scenario Four depends on the terms of the plan. If the
former employee would have been eligible for coverage under the
terms of the plan but for the termination of his employment, the em-
ployee would have standing under Section 510. If, however, the for-
mer employee would not have been eligible to participate under the
terms of the plan, the employee would not have standing.
Although Scenario Five involves a reduction in hours rather than
a termination in employment, a similar analysis should apply. If, but
for the reduction in hours, an employee would have been eligible for
coverage under the terms of the plan, the employee should have stand-
ing under Section 510. If, on the other hand, the employee would not
have been eligible to participate under the terms of the plan, even if
the employee's hours had not been reduced, the employee should not
have standing.
This is not to suggest that an employer may avoid liability under
Section 510 without penalty by drafting its plan to exclude a large
swath of its full-time workforce. If an employer drafts its plan so that
it does not cover at least 95% of its full-time employees, 107 the em-
ployer will be subject to the section 4980H(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code's failure to cover penalty even if the employer provides afforda-
ble coverage to most of its full-time workers.
2. Employer's Intent
Section 510 prohibits an employer from taking adverse employ-
ment action "for the purpose of" interfering with a participant's attain-
ment of a right under a plan. 108 Thus, an employer is only subject to
liability under Section 510 if the employer had "specific intent" to en-
gage in a prohibited activity.109
105. Without deciding when, if ever, the "but for" test should apply, the court in
Becker found that the former employees did not have standing under the "but for" test
because "Mack's refusal to rehire former employees did not 'in and of itself strip them of
their employee status." Becker, 281 F.3d at 378.
106. Shahid, 76 F.3d at 1410-11 (quoting Swinney, 46 F.3d at 519).
107. See supra Section II and accompanying text.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012).
109. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Starcom Mediavest Grp., Inc., 522 F.3d 623, 628 (6th Cir.
2008); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 981 (1992); Kimbro v. Atl. Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
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Typically, direct proof of specific intent to engage in a prohibited
activity is hard to come by.110 In the case of the employer mandate,
however, there are widespread reports of employers stating that they
have or plan to terminate employees or reduce their hours in order to
avoid the pay-or-play mandate."' 1 To the extent that such termina-
tions or reductions in hours prevent employees from participating
under the terms of an existing health care plan, such admissions
would likely qualify as direct proof of specific intent. Indeed, two at-
torneys have advised employers to "avoid making public statements
on employment or health benefits strategy"112 and to be careful in
their internal communications in order to protect against Section 510
liability.113
Absent direct proof of specific intent, courts apply a three-step
burden-shifting process similar to that applied in Title VII cases to
determine liability under Section 510.114 Under this three-step pro-
cess, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing
(1) that the employer engaged in prohibited conduct, (2) that was
taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of any
right to which the employee may become entitled.115 If the plaintiff
establishes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
produce evidence supporting a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the action. 116 The employer need not prove, but must simply artic-
ulate, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ-
ment action.117 If the employer satisfies its burden, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the proffered reason was a prextext.11 8
Former and current employees with standing under Scenarios
Four and Five should have little difficulty establishing the third ele-
ment of a prima facie case. 119 If, as discussed above, an employee has
denied, 498 U.S. 814 (1990); Gavalik v. Cont'1 Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851 (3d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987).
110. See Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852 (stating that "[i]n most cases, . . . specific intent
will not be demonstrated by 'smoking gun' evidence").
111. See supra note 64 (citing relevant authorities).
112. Adam C. Solander & Elizabeth B. Bradley, Trying to Avoid ACA Mandate? ER-
ISA 510 May Catch You, LAw360 (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/
464969/trying-to-avoid-aca-mandate-erisa-510-may-catch-you.
113. Id.
114. SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS LAw 15-81 to 15-82 (Jeffrey Lewis, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter
Employee Benefits Law]. See, e.g., Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852-53.
115. See, e.g., id. at 852.
116. See, e.g., id. at 853.
117. See, e.g., Dister v. Cont'l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1988).
118. See, e.g., Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 853.
119. Cf. Schlett v. Avco Fin. Svcs., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 823, 834 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(finding plaintiff failed to offer sufficient proof to support her claim that employer's deci-
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standing, the employee necessarily can show that he or she would
have become entitled to health care coverage but for the prohibited
conduct.
Former employees in Scenario Four should also have little diffi-
culty establishing the first element: the employer engaged in prohib-
ited conduct. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has
declared that "[by its terms § 510 protects plan participants from ter-
mination motivated by an employer's desire to prevent a pension from
vesting."120 Although there is less direct precedent on the issue, 121 a
termination in hours, particularly if accompanied by a reduction in
pay, should also constitute prohibited employer conduct.122
Whether a former or current employee can satisfy the second ele-
ment, that the prohibited conduct was taken for the purpose of inter-
fering with the employees' right to coverage, depends on the evidence
available and the quantum of proof the court requires. 123
Assuming that the former or current employee can establish a
prima facie case, whether the employee would ultimately prevail de-
pends on whether the employer can produce a legitimate, non-pretex-
tual reason for terminating the employee or reducing the employee's
hours.
sion to reduce employee to part-time status was motivated by desire to interfere with
her ERISA benefits). A reduction in hours that leads to a reduction in compensation
constitutes an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. See Holland v.
Washington, 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007). See also Points to Remember, 34 EM-
PLOYEE TERMINATIONS LAW BULLETIN 5 (Nov. 2013) (describing settlement in case in
which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") treated reduced
hours as an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII).
120. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990) (emphasis added).
121. The court in Schlett treated a reduction in hours to part-time status as em-
ployer conduct protected by Section 510. Nevertheless, it rejected the employee's claim
due to insufficient proof. Schlett, 950 F. Supp. at 835.
122. In Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the Supreme Court
established the standard for determining what constitutes adverse employment action
for retaliation purposes under Title VII. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). Specifically, the Court
defined adverse employment action as action that "would have been materially adverse
to a reasonable employee or job applicant." Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). A reduction in hours that leads to a reduction in compen-
sation would clearly appear to be materially adverse to a reasonable employee. Cf
Points to Remember, 34 Employee Terminations Law Bulletin 5 (Nov. 2013) (describing
settlement in case in which EEOC treated reduction in hours as an adverse employment
action for purposes of Title VII).
123. See Employee Benefits Law, supra note 113, at 15-80 to 15-81, n.619, n.619-20
(Jeffrey Lewis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (citing and describing Section 510 decisions re-
garding quantum of proof necessary to establish prima facie case and establish prof-
fered reason is pretext).
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B. ACA WHISTLEBLOWER PRovisIoN
Section 1558 of the Affordable Care Act, commonly referred to as
the ACA whistleblower provision, 124 prohibits an employer from,
among other things, "discharg[ing] or in any manner discriminatling]
against. any employee with respect to his or her compensation, terms,
conditions, or other privileges of employment because the employee (or
an employee acting at the request of the employee) has received"125 a
premium tax credit or subsidy under the Affordable Care Act for
health insurance purchased through an exchange. 126 This provision
is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 218c as Section 18C of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.
The preamble to the Department of Labor's ("DOL's") interim fi-
nal regulation explains "the relationship between the employee's re-
ceipt of a credit and the potential tax penalty imposed on an employer
could create an incentive for an employer to retaliate against an em-
ployee. Section 18C protects employees against such retaliation."127
As an anti-retaliation statute, the ACA whistleblower provision
differs fundamentally from the ERISA Section 510 interference
clause. It prohibits employers from retaliating against employees af-
ter they have exercised their rights under the Affordable Care Act to
purchase subsidized health insurance through an exchange. The ER-
ISA Section 510 interference clause,128 in contrast, prohibits employ-
ers from preventing employees from exercising their rights under a
plan or under ERISA.
124. See, e.g., Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under Section
1558 of the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 13222-01, 13222 (Feb. 27, 2013) (referring
to provision as "the employee protection (whistleblower) provision of section 1558 of the
Affordable Care Act").
125. 29 U.S.C. § 218c (2012).
126. The ACA whistleblower provision also contains four other prohibitions, includ-
ing a prohibition against discriminating against employees for providing information to
the government about potential violations of the Affordable Care Act. For a brief over-
view of the provision, see Nancy Bloodgood & Lucy C. Sanders, An Overview of the Anti-
Retaliation Provision in the New Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 58-DEC.
FED. LAw. 32 (2011).
127. Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under Section 1558 of
the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 13223 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1984).
128. Section 510 of ERISA also includes an anti-retaliation provision. Claims under
the ERISA Section 510 anti-retaliation provision and the ACA whistleblower anti-retal-
iation provision are mutually exclusive. For a claim to arise under the ERISA Section
510 anti-retaliation provision, the employee must have exercised his right to benefits
under the employer's plan. If an employee is covered by an employer-sponsored health
care plan, then the employee is not eligible for subsidized coverage under a health in-
surance exchange and thus an employer cannot have retaliated against the employee
for exercising his rights to subsidized coverage under an exchange.
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1. Preemptive Workforce Realignments
The ACA whistleblower provision expressly protects employees
who have "received" a premium tax credit or subsidy for health insur-
ance purchased through an exchange. 129 The DOL's interim final reg-
ulations state that the provision "provides protection for an employee
from retaliation because the employee has received a credit under Sec-
tion 36B of the [IRC], or a cost-sharing reduction (referred to as a 'sub-
sidy' in section 18C) under the Affordable Care Act section 1402."13o
Thus, like all anti-retaliation provisions, the ACA whistleblower pro-
vision, by its terms, is reactive in nature. 131 It only applies after "pro-
tected activity" has occurred, that is, after an employee has purchased
subsidized health insurance through an exchange.
Thus, on its face, the ACA whistleblower provision would not ap-
ply to any of the five scenarios described above unless the employer
declined to hire the individual, terminated the employee's employ-
ment, or reduced the employee's hours after the employee purchased
subsidized health insurance through an exchange. Commentators,
however, have suggested that the ACA whistleblower provision might
apply to "preemptive strikes," that is, workforce realignments that oc-
cur before an employee purchases health insurance through an
exchange. 132
129. 29 U.S.C. § 218c(a)(1).
130. Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under Section 1558 of
the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 13231 (adding 29 C.F.R. § 1984.100(a)) (empha-
sis added). Section 1984.102(b)(1) contains substantially similar language. See Proce-
dures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under Section 1558 of the Affordable
Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 13232 (adding 29 C.F.R. § 1984.102(b)(1) (providing, "An em-
ployee is protected against retaliation because the employee (or an individual acting at
the request of the employee) has: (1) Received a credit under section 36B of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. section 36B or a subsidy under section 1402 of the
Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 18071.") (emphasis added).
131. Cf Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipator Retaliation, Threats, and the Silencing
of the Brown Collar Workforce, 50 Am. Bus. L. J. 779, 790 (2013) (noting that all anti-
retaliation provisions are reactive).
132. See Andrea L. Ben-Yosef, Implementing, Avoiding ACA Can Expose Employers
to Litigation Claims, Speaker Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 17, 2013), http://
www.bna.com/implementing-avoiding-aca-nl7179880775/ ("A question for the court is
whether a preemptive strike by an employer is actionable, Napoli said, because the em-
ployer reduced the hours before the employee received the subsidy. This will be played
out in the courts, he said."); James Napoli & Brian Neulander, The View From Pros-
kauer: Health Care Reform Litigation Risks - The Intersection of ERISA Section 510
and the Affordable Care Act's Whistleblower Provisions, THE ERISA LITIGATION NEWS-
LEITER (June 2013), http://www.proskauer.com/publications/newsletters/erisa-litiga-
tion-newsletter-june-2013/ ("The ACA whistleblower issue is whether [the reduction of
an employee's hours so that the employee would not have coverage and not be full-time]
would be prohibited by being viewed as reducing hours of work in anticipation of the
employee receiving a subsidy to purchase insurance via an exchange and in an effort to
avoid a penalty with respect to the employee."). But see Timothy P. Brechtel & Ricardo
X. Carlo, 'Play or pay' and whistleblower protections under healthcare reform, LoUIsIANA
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Not surprisingly, no reported case has yet addressed the question
of whether the ACA whistleblower provision applies to preemptive
workforce realignments. 1 3 3 Moreover, the legislative history of the
ACA whistleblower provision is sparse1 34 and thus does not provide
any clear guidance on whether a court should interpret the provision
broadly so as to apply to preemptive workforce realignments. Never-
theless, it seems that the ACA whistleblower provision should not ap-
EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER (April 25, 2013) (contending that it would be difficult to show
cause and effect between an employer's actions and an employee's exercise of his pro-
tected rights before the pay-or-play mandates become effective and the exchanges be-
come operational).
133. At the time this Article went to press, a Westlaw search identified eight cases
citing this provision. See Jallali v. USA-Funds W. Asset Mgmt. Inc. and Son Healthcare
Grp., No. 11-62510-CIV, 2012 WL 3291873 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2012) (dismissing com-
plaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Rosenfield v. Globaltranz Ent.,
Inc., CV 11-02327-PHX-NVW, 2012 WL 2572984 (D. Ariz. July 2, 2012) (holding that
"this title" in 29 U.S.C. § 218c refers to title I of the ACA, not title 29 of the U.S.C.); Falk
v. City of Glendale, No. 12-v-00925-JLK, 2012 WL 2390556, n.11 (D. Colo. June 25,
2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 218c in support of proposition that "if Plaintiffs opposition
centered not on discrimination, but on workplace conditions, then she must consider
whether an FLSA retaliation claim provides an appropriate remedy"); Jean-Louis v.
Metro. Cable Comms. Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 111, 120 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the
FLSA anti-retaliation provision also uses the term "employer"); Daugherty v. Encana
Oil & Gas (USA) Inc., No. 10-cv-02272-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 2791338 (D. Colo. July 15,
2011) (noting that plaintiff brought claim under 29 U.S.C. § 218c, among other counts,
but staying complaint and granting motion for mandatory arbitration); Wiley v. As-
plundh Tree Expert Co., No. 2:13-CV-02952, 2014 WL 1017208 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 17,
2014) (deciding portion of wrongful discharge claim based on overtime pay violations
was preempted by FLSA); Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014)
(citing Section 218c in affirming summary judgment for employer on Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) claim because whistleblower claim was preempted);
Richter v. Design at Work, No. 14-CV-650, 2014 WL 3014972 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2014)
(nothing that "[ilt is unclear from the fact of Section 218(c)(5) whether 'this title' refers
to Title XXIX of the United States Code, which relates generally to labor, or to Title I of
the PPACA" but deciding that even "if [the plaintiffs] claim fell within the protections of
Section 218c, that provision requires a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a civil action in court").
134. The legislative history of the Affordable Care Act is lengthy and convoluted.
See John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative Pro-
cedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 LAw LIaR. J. 132 (2013). ProQuest Congres-
sional, which houses one of the most robust collections of the ACA legislative history,
identifies twenty-five separate bills that were considered in the enactment of the Afford-
able Care Act. Id. at 134. Two of those bills, 111 H.R. 3200 and H.R. 3692, contain a
whistleblower provision, 111 H.R. 3200 § 153 and 111 H.R. 3962 § 253. The
whistleblower provisions in those bills, however, do not contain a protection for em-
ployer retaliation against employees who purchase subsidized health insurance on an
Exchange. Rather, this particular protection first appears as Section 1558 of the No-
vember 19, 2009 Senate amendment to 111 H.R. 3590. S. Amend. 2786, 111th Cong.
(2009) (enacted). Because the provision first appears as an amendment, there is no
committee report explaining the reason for this provision. See Cannan, 105 LAw LiaR.
J. at 160, 164 (explaining that White House officials and Democratic congressional lead-
ers worked outside the traditional legislative process using budget reconciliation to pass
the eventual ACA).
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ply to an employer's decision to reduce the size of its workforce to
avoid the pay-or-play mandate.
In enacting the Affordable Care Act, Congress elected to impose
the pay-or-play penalty on "applicable large employers."' 35 The Af-
fordable Care Act defines "applicable large employers" as employers
with 50 or more full-time employees,13 6 and it defines the term "full-
time employee" as an employee who works 30 or more hours per
week.137 The Affordable Care Act does not, however, mandate an em-
ployer's size. Employers should be free to determine the size of their
workforces and avoid application of the pay-or-play mandate if they so
desire.138 Thus, the ACA whistleblower provision should not apply to
an employer's business decision to reduce the size of its workforce so
as to avoid application of the pay-or-play mandate.
2. Individualized Preemptive Strikes
The ACA whistleblower provision raises another, more difficult,
preemptive strike issue. Suppose that an employer threatens to ter-
minate an employee if the employee purchases subsidized health in-
surance through an exchange. Does the mere threat of termination
violate the ACA whistleblower provision if the employee does not
purchase subsidized insurance?
Arguably, the anti-retaliation provision should apply in such a
case. If the statute protects employees who actually lose their jobs
because they purchase subsidized health insurance, then a fortiori, it
should also protect employees who are even more vulnerable and
forego subsidized health insurance for fear of losing their jobs. 139
The plain language of the statute does not support such an inter-
pretation. Nor do the regulations. Rather, according to the plain text,
the ACA whistleblower provision only applies after an employee
purchases insurance on an exchange. An advocate, however, might
point to some, albeit limited, authority in other contexts to support
such a claim.
First, in Sauers v. Salt Lake County,140 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Title VII of the Civil Rights
135. I.R.C. § 4980H(a)-(b).
136. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2).
137. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4).
138. Cf. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (be-
ginning decision with the proposition that the American with Disabilities Act, like other
federal anti-discrimination provisions, is inapplicable to very small employers and de-
termining whether particular individuals qualified as employees for purposes of deter-
mining whether employer was subject to the Act).
139. Cf Alexander, supra note 130 (arguing that employment anti-retaliation stat-
utes should be stretched to protect the vulnerable "brown collar" workforce).
140. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
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Act protects against preemptive retaliations.141 In that case, the
plaintiff claimed that she was transferred two days after her employer
engaged in prohibited sexual harassment in order to prevent her from
filing a sexual harassment charge. The court declared that "[a]ction
taken against an individual in anticipation of that person engaging in
protected opposition to discrimination is no less retaliatory than ac-
tion taken after the fact."142
Similarly, in Parexel International LLC and Theresa Neus-
chafer, 143 the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") decided that
terminating an employee as "a pre-emptive strike to prevent her from
engaging in an activity protected by the [National Labor Relations]
Act [("NLRA")]" 144 violates the NLRA. 145 In that case, an employee
told her supervisor that she believed that South African employees
were receiving higher wages and other favorable treatment and that
"the whole unit should quit and come back with a raise."146 About a
week later, management met with the employee and asked, among
other things, whether she had discussed her concerns with anyone
else. The employee advised management that she had not, and
shortly thereafter, she was terminated. The employer claimed that it
had not violated the NLRA because the employee had not engaged in
"concerted activity" (discussed her wage concerns with any other em-
ployees) before she was terminated. The Board found that an em-
ployee need not have engaged in concerted activity before she may be
141. Sauers v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993). Sauers has been
cited with approval for this proposition on a few occasions. See EEOC v. Cognis Corp.,
No. 10-CV-2182, 2012 WL 1893725 (C.D. Ill. May 23, 2012) (finding a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether employer engaged in preemptively retaliating against em-
ployees in violation of Title VII when employer required employees to sign last chance
agreements (LCAs) as a condition of continued employment when LCAs threatened ter-
mination if an employee engaged in statutorily protected activity); EEOC v. Bojangles,
284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 328 (M.D. N.C. 2003) (describing as its first interpretive principle
that Title VII's retaliation provision encompasses anticipatory retaliation); Beckel v.
Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting plaintiffs estoppel
defense and stating that the threat of firing employee if she sued would be form of antic-
ipatory retaliation under Title VII).
142. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1128. The court nevertheless found that the trial court's find-
ing that the employer rebutted any inference of discrimination was supported by the
evidence and not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1128-29.
143. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (Jan. 28, 2011). For an extensive discussion of the case,
see Michael C. Duff, New Nip in the Bud: Does the Obama Board's Preemptive Strike
Doctrine Enhance Tactical Employment Law Strategies?, 16 EMP. RTs. & E1WP. PoL'Y J.
143 (2012).
144. Parexel Int'l, LLC and Theresa Neuschafer, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 82, at *2 (Jan. 28,
2011).
145. Courts have cited Parexel with apparent approval on a couple of occasions. See
N.L.R.B. v. RELCO Locomotives, Inc., 734 F.3d 764, 790 (8th Cir. 2013); Greater
Omaha Packing Co., 17-CA-08735, 2012 WL 6755114 (N.L.R.B. Div. Judges Dec. 27,
2012).
146. Parexel, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 82, at *1.
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protected by the NLRA. According to the Board, "[ilf an employer acts
to prevent concerted protected activity-to 'nip it in the bud'-that ac-
tion interferes with and restrains the exercise of Section 7 rights and
is unlawful without more."147
These cases offer some support for the proposition that the ACA
whistleblower provision should apply to preemptive threats. 148 Nev-
ertheless, there is strong countervailing authority that the scope of
the provision should be limited according to its express terms.
Although the Supreme Court has taken an expansive approach to
anti-retaliation statutes in recent years, 149 it has not completely un-
moored its decisions from the statutory text. Rather, the Court has
begun its analyses by carefully considering the text of the statute
before adopting an expansive reading of the statute. Indeed, accord-
ing to one commentator, "[n]owhere is the emphasis on text more ap-
parent than in the Court's interpretation of antiretaliation
provisions." 5 0
For example, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
White, 15 the Court held that retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act need not affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of employ-
ment to be actionable. Rather, "a plaintiff must show that a reasona-
ble employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse, 'which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimina-
tion.'" 152 In so holding, the Court carefully considered the text of the
statute. Specifically, the Court began its analysis by quoting the text
of the provision and comparing it with the text of Title VII's antidis-
crimination provision.a53 It noted that the antidiscrimination provi-
sion included language, such as "hire," "discharge," "compensation,
terms, conditions of employment," that limited the scope of the provi-
sion while no such limiting language was contained in the anti-retalia-
147. Id. at *5.
148. Although Sauers and Parexel offer expansive interpretations, many lower
courts take a narrower, textual approach to preemptive strike claims under anti-retalia-
tion statutes. See Alexander, supra note 130, at 790-92; Alex B. Long, Employment
Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 525, 561-63 (2011). For example, in
Hill v. Mr. Money Finance Co., the Northern District of Ohio dismissed an employee's
retaliation claim under the Title 31 whistleblower provision, 31 U.S.C. § 5328, because
the employee was fired before he had acted on his threat to file a complaint under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 491 F. Supp. 2d 725, 735-36 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
149. For a more detailed discussion of these cases and anti-retaliation jurisprudence
in general, see Long, supra note 147; Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's An-
tiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375 (2010).
150. Long, supra note 147 at 531.
151. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
152. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting
Washington v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)).
153. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 61-62.
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tion provision. 154 Only after carefully studying the text of the statute
did the Court turn to Congressional purpose to support a difference
between the antidiscrimination and anti-retaliation provisions with
respect to the scope of protection.155
In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 15 6 the
Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act's ("FLSA") retaliation
protection extends to employees who make oral as well as written
complaints. In that case, the Court again began with the text of the
statute,157 which forbids employers "to discharge or in any manner
discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed
any complaint."15 After finding that the term "filed" is not suscepti-
ble to a single meaning,159 the Court considered, among other things,
the Act's basic objectives 60 in determining that the term should in-
clude oral as well as written complaints.
In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,e16 the Court held
that Title VII anti-retaliation protection extends to third parties, spe-
cifically an employee's fianc6 who was fired after the employee filed a
sex-discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"). The Court again began its analysis by quoting
the text of the statute: "a civil action may be brought . .. by the person
claiming to be aggrieved." 162 Finding that the language could support
a number of different interpretations, the Court applied the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act approach of authorizing suit by "any person ...
adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of the relevant
statute."163
The DOL has taken a similar textual approach in its regulations
implementing the ACA whistleblower provision. As noted above, the
regulations follow the statutory text in stating that the provision "pro-
vides protection . . . because the employee has received" subsidized
154. Id. at 62.
155. Id. at 63 (declaring that "[tihe antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace
where individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, relig-
ious, or gender-based status" while "[tihe antiretaliation provision seeks to secure that
primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with
an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees").
156. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
157. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331
(2011) (stating, "[w]e begin with the text of the statute").
158. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)) (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 1331-33.
160. Id. at 1333-34.
161. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
162. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869 (2011) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).
163. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551).
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coverage through an exchange. 164 In addition, in explaining its broad
construction of the term "employee,"165 the preamble first quotes the
"plain language" of the statute. 166 Specifically, the preamble refers to
the statute's prohibition of retaliation against "any employee" and its
authorization to "[a]n employee who believes that he or she has been
discriminated against by any employer in violation of this section" to
file a complaint.167 It then contrasts that statutory language with the
narrower protections contained in sections 6 and 7 of the FLSA.168
Finally, as further support for its broad interpretation of the term, it
cites Supreme Court precedent that establishes that "'any' has an ex-
pansive meaning that does not limit the word it modifies."169
In sum, in light of the statutory text, regulatory language, and
bulk of judicial authority according fidelity to the statutory text of
anti-retaliation statutes, it appears unlikely that a court would find
that the ACA whistleblower statute applies to an employer's threat to
terminate an employee if the employee purchases subsidized insur-
ance through an exchange.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, employer-spon-
sored health insurance was common170 but entirely voluntary. The
Affordable Care Act introduces, for the first time, a penalty for certain
large employers that fail to offer affordable health insurance to their
employees and their dependents. Originally scheduled to go into ef-
fect in 2014, implementation of the pay-or-play penalty has proven
complicated and controversial.
Among the issues raised by the Affordable Care Act's pay-or-play
penalty are who are "dependents" and how "affordable" is to be deter-
mined with respect to dependent coverage. In its implementing regu-
lations, the Treasury Department has determined that the term
dependents means children, not spouses, and affordability is to be
164. Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under Section 1558 of
the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 13231 (adding 29 C.F.R. § 1984.102(b)(1)).
165. See id. (adding 29 C.F.R. § 1984.101(3) (defining employee to include former
employees and applicants for employment).
166. Id. at 13225.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Specifically, the preamble cites Kasten, discussed at notes 156-159, supra, and
U.S v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1977).
170. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST,
supra note 32, at 48, Exhibit 3.1 (showing that 59% of all employers offered health in-
surance in 2009); Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the
Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2013 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF
No. 390, Sept. 2013, at 5, Figure 1 (showing that about 60% of the nonelderly popula-
tion had employment-based health insurance in 2009).
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based on the cost of employee, self-only, coverage, not the cost of fam-
ily coverage.
Since the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, some employers
have decided to cut back on their health care coverage. Others are
looking at ways to realign or restructure their workforces so as to
avoid the pay-or-play penalty, or at least reduce its impact.
Because the Affordable Care Act pay-or-play penalty does not ap-
ply if an employer does not offer affordable health insurance to its em-
ployees' spouses, perhaps it is not surprising that some employers
have cut back on their provision of spousal benefits. Interestingly,
though, employers to date have only cut back on spousal benefits for
working spouses with access to health care coverage through their
own employer and not for spouses with no other access to health care
coverage.
In addition to reducing spousal coverage, reports abound that em-
ployers have, or are considering, reducing the size of their workforces
or hours of some of their employees in order to avoid the pay-or-play
penalty. Some commentators have suggested that such workforce
realignments might run afoul of Section 510 of ERISA or the ACA
whistleblower provision.
Although no court has yet addressed these issues, it appears un-
likely that employers that currently do not offer health insurance
would violate ERISA Section 510 if they elected to reduce the size of
their workforces. On the other hand, employers that currently offer
health insurance might run afoul of ERISA Section 510 if they inten-
tionally terminate their employees or reduce their hours in order to
avoid the pay-or-play penalty.
It appears unlikely that an employer would violate the ACA
whistleblower provision by terminating employees or reducing their
hours before any employee has purchased subsidized health insurance
on an exchange. If, on the other hand, an employer threatens to ter-
minate an employee if the employee purchases health insurance on an
exchange, a court might find that the employer violated the spirit of
the ACA whistleblower provision. The text of the statute, however,
does not support such a holding.
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